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Statutory Time Limitations on the
Availability of Judicial Review of
Regulations Under SMCRA
INTRODUCTION
Statutory time limitations on the availability of judicial re-
view of agency action have recently become popular with Con-
gress. This is particularly true in the area of environmental
regulation.' Time restrictions on judicial review offer significant
benefits to agencies in the administration of national regulatory
programs; 2 however, carte blanche use of these short-fused stat-
utes of limitations to bar all late challenges to a rulemaking
raises serious constitutional concerns. Congress can limit or pre-
clude judicial review of many rulemaking issues,3 but due proc-
ess and separation of powers principles should prevent Congress
from removing all questions of law from the courts concerning
an agency rulemaking . 4 That courts have recognized these con-
cerns is evidenced by their frequent narrow interpretations of
statutory review restrictions to avoid potential constitutional con-
flicts.,
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 19776
contains a time restriction on judicial review 7 that has been
See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 509 (b)(l) & (2), 33 U.S.C. §
1369(b)(1) & (2) (1982) (90 days); Clean Air Act § 307(b)(1) & (2), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)
& (2) (1982) (60 days); Noise Control Act § 16(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4915(a) (1983) (90 days);
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1)
(1982) (60 days).
See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
I Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1982) [hereinafter APA];
see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (challenge of regulation barred by
running of sixty-day review period); Sheldon v. Sill, 12 L. Ed. (1 How.) 1147, 1151
(1850); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Warren, New Light on the History of
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49 (1923).
4 See infra Parts IV & V.
See infra Part III.
6 Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91
Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)) [hereinafter SMCRA].
SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982) (sixty days).
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successfully used by the Office of Surface Mining8 to preclude
many late challenges to its regulations. 9 Section 526(a)(1) of
SMCRA provides that national rules or regulations which are
promulgated by the Secretary "shall be subject to judicial re-
view. . . ."0 The petition for review, however, must "be filed
in the appropriate Court within sixty days from the date of such
action, or after such date if the petition is based solely on
grounds arising after the sixtieth day.""
The sixty-day restriction on judicial review of rulemakings
under SMCRA is typical of the review limitations that exist in
other environmental statutes. 2 The preclusive reach of Section
526(a)(1), however, has yet to be fully delineated by the courts.
I The "Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement" [hereinafter
OSM] is the agency responsible for implementing and enforcing SMCRA. See SMCRA
§ 201, 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (1982).
9 See, e.g., Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Department of Interior of the United States, 553
F. Supp. 872, 878 (D. Utah 1982); In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig. 456 F. Supp.
1301, 1307 (D.D.C. 1978); In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig. (II), 100
F.R.D. 710, 712 (D.D.C. 1983); cf. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Hodel, No. 85-2206 (4th
Cir. 1986); Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469, 472-76 (l1th Cir. 1984). But
cf. Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 655 F.2d 732, 738 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 995 (1982).
SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982).
Section 526(a)(1) provides:
(1) Any action of the Secretary to approve or disapprove a State program
or to prepare or promulgate a Federal program pursuant to this chapter
shall be subject to judicial review by the United States District Court for
the District which includes the capital of the State whose program is at
issue. Any action by the Secretary promulgating national rules or regula-
tions including standards pursuant to sections 1251, 1265, 1266, and 1273
of this title shall be subject to judicial review in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia Circuit [sic]. Any other action constituting
rulemaking by the Secretary shall be subject to judicial review only by the
United States District Court for the District in which the surface coal
mining operation is located. Any action subject to judicial review under
this subsection shall be affirmed unless the court concludes that such action
is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law. A petition for
review of any action subject to judicial review under this subsection shall
be filed in the appropriate Court within sixty days from the date of such
action, or after such date if the petition is based solely on grounds arising
after the sixtieth day. Any such petition may be made by any person who
participated in the administrative proceedings and who is aggrieved by the
action of the Secretary.
30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982).
2 See supra note 1.
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If Section 526(a)(1) is interpreted to cut off even constitutionally
based challenges after the sixty-day period has run, then due
process and separation of powers concerns are at their greatest.13
The availability of full judicial review for sixty days goes a long
way in protecting a party's due process rights. In some exten-
uating circumstances, however, due process may mandate that
court review be available after the sixty-day period has expired.14
By attempting to remove constitutional and jurisdictional-based
claims from the courts after only sixty days, Congress is inter-
fering with an inherent judicial function. 5 Removal of these
essential questions of law from Article III courts conflicts with
separation of powers as mandated by the Constitution.
This Note examines the scope of the sixty-day limit on ju-
dicial review under Section 526(a)(1) of SMCRA and the due
process and separation of powers concerns that may arise in its
application. Initially, this Note presents the practical implications
for OSM and industry of a strict application of the sixty-day
limitation and discusses the role of courts when the time bar is
raised as a defense to an attack on a regulation's validity. The
remainder of the Note analyzes three key questions concerning
the sixty-day restriction on judicial review: (1) what is the in-
tended scope of the time limitation; (2) urider what circumstances
might due process be violated by application of the time bar;
and (3) would a broad interpretation of Section 526(a)(1) render
the section in conflict with separation of powers principles.
I. APPLICATION OF THE SIXTY-DAY REVIEW RESTRICTION
The effect of the time limitation in Section 526(a)(1) is to
bar a challenge of a regulation that is not initiated within sixty
days of publication of the final rule' 6 in the Federal Register.'
7
Application of the sixty-day cut-off advances several national
" See infra notes 176-85, 216-27 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 241-51 and accompanying text.
36 See cases cited supra note 9.
' The Notice and Comment rulemaking procedures of the APA must be followed
by the Secretary in promulgating regulations. The APA also mandates that general notice
of proposed and final rules be published in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (d)
(1982).
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interests, yet can seem unfair to individual challengers and in-
dustry as a whole. The role of the courts in this situation is to
determine whether the sixty-day bar reaches to the challenge at
hand, and if so, whether its application would be repugnant to
a petitioner's constitutional rights.
A. Practical Implications
The sixty-day time limitation promotes judicial economy by
insuring that all attacks are brought expeditiously and that sim-
ilar actions are consolidated in a single suit."8 The time limit
also has the advantage of quickly establishing the enforceability
of national standards and guidelines. 9 When the sixty-day chal-
lenge period has passed, OSM can begin to enforce the new
standards without concern that the regulation might be over-
turned in a subsequent challenge. The sixty-day review period
also encourages interested parties20 to participate2 in the rule-
making process so that they are in a position22 to raise any
legitimate concerns in a judicial action. 2
" Section 526(a)(1) of SMCRA also requires all challenges of "national rules or
regulations" to be brought in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982). The scope of the venue provisions in Section
526(a)(1) are not addressed in this paper. Compare Commonwealth of Virginia v. Watt,
741 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1984) with Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 655 F.2d 731 (6th
Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 456 U.S. 955 (1982).
19 See SMCRA § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982); Drummond Coal Co., 735 F.2d
at 474-75; see also Chrysler Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 600 F.2d 904,
912 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing time restrictions on review under Noise Control Act).
See generally Verkuil, Congressional Limitations on Judicial Review of Rules, 57 Tut.
L. REv. 733, 742 (1983).
Typically, parties that would be interested in challenging a rulemaking under
SMCRA include mining companies, landholding companies, individuals who own prop-
erty near coal mining areas, environmental groups, and state regulatory agencies. Inter-
view with Marcus McGraw, Attorney with Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald, in Lexington,
Kentucky (Feb. 15, 1987) [hereinafter cited as McGraw Interview].
11 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982) provides that interested persons shall have "an oppor-
tunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments .... " Id.
2 The standing provision of Section 526(a)(1) could be read to limit the right to
file a petition only to persons who actually participated in rulemaking. See infra note
26 and accompanying text.
21 If the validity of a regulation could be challenged at any time, an in:erested
party would not have much incentive to participate in the rulemaking when the proposed
[VOL. 3:127
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Despite the administrative benefits of review restrictions,
strict application of the cut-off seems unjust to petitioners with
legitimate claims who either could not challenge or had no
motivation to challenge the regulation during the sixty-day pe-
riod. The coal mining industry is dynamic. 24 A company that is
not in the mining business during the review period would not
likely be motivated to challenge a regulation (even if it was
aware of the rule's promulgation). 25 Perhaps more significantly,
the company may not have been threatened with sufficient im-
pact by the rule to have standing to bring a challenge.2 6 Thus,
regulation would not have an immediate direct impact on its business concerns. Yet, the
technical and business experience of the party might be valuable to the integrity of the
rulemaking decision. An express purpose of Congress is to "assure . . . public partici-
pation in the development, revision, and enforcement of regulations [and] stand-
ards .. " SMCRA § 102(i), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(i) (1982). The sixty-day limitation on
challenges encourages participation by parties that could be affected by the proposed
regulation.
1, Both large and small mining companies are frequently sold outright. In some
instances, the purchaser is a corporation that has no other mining interests. Also, small
operators may still enter the industry at any time, although in recent years they seem to
be a disappearing breed. See McGraw Interview, supra note 20.
5 Under the statutory scheme of SMCRA the petitioner's interest may be aesthetic
or economic. An entity that is not in the mining business, has no property interests in
mining areas, and is not active in environmental issues will likely have no motivation
for challenging a regulation.
16 The first prerequisite to standing is that the party must have suffered or be
threatened with some specific tangible injury under operation of the regulation. Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972). The injury in fact requirement of standing
is that "the party seeking review be himself among the injured." See Association of
Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (The challenged
agency action must have caused the plaintiff "injury in fact" so that the adjudication
is presented in an adversarial context.). Secondly, the interest sought to be protected
must be arguably within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the organic
statute. Data Processing Serv., 397 U.S. at 153. SMCRA was passed with the purposes
of protecting "society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal
mining" as well as assuring that coal supplies essential to the nation are maintained.
SMCRA § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982). SMCRA's statutory scheme extends to aesthetic,
environmental, and economic interests that can be impacted by mining. These interests
are sufficient to meet the zone of interests prong of the standing test. Data Processing
Serv., 397 U.S. at 154. However, as Sierra Club establishes, a cognizable interest alone
is insufficient to impart standing unless injury in fact also exists. Sierra Club, 405 U.S.
at 734-35. In addition, Section 526(a)(1) may also further restrict the availability of
judicial review through its "standing provision." "Any such petition may be made by
any person who participated in the administrative proceedings and who is aggrieved by
the action of the Secretary." 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added); see supra
note II for full text of section 526(a)(1). Although it is beyond the scope of this Note,
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW AND POLICY
such a company may never have had an opportunity to challenge
a regulation even if it so desired during the review period.
More typically, a petitioner may not have any motivation to
challenge a rulemaking during the review period. Court attacks
on regulations are very costly. 27 Legal action may not be eco-
nomically prudent even when valid grounds for a challenge exist
if the party will not be immediately affected by the regulation2
or if the impact of the rule is unknown. 29 For example, a coal
company that only conducts "area mine" 30 operations in the
Midwest would probably not challenge regulations that only
affect "steep slope contour"'" operations. If the company later
acquires reserves in steep slope areas, Section 526(a)(1) will
probably prevent it from challenging the regulations at that
time.3 2
The sixty-day period provided in Section 526(a)(1) usually
affords large coal operators and national environmental groups
that keep abreast of developments in the Federal Register on a
daily basis, a sufficient period of time in which to act. The
judicial review period is harsh, however, when applied to private
resolution of the standing issue under Section 526(a)(1) will have additional impact on
the availability of judical review under the section. The effect of a restrictive interpre-
tation of the standing provision will be that a potentially impacted party will not be
able to challenge the regulation in court if it did not participate in the rulemaking (even
within the sixty-day review period). This restrictive interpretation will make due process
and separation of powers concerns even more compelling.
21 McGraw Interview, supra note 20.
28 Id.
" In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 456 F. Supp. at 1307 (sixty-day limit
applies despite the "possibility of 'unpredictable applications' of the regulations in the
future . . .").
10 Area mining is a type of surface coal mining that is used in flat to very gently
rolling topography. These conditions occur in the Midwestern and Western coal fields.
Large draglines and shovels are often employed to uncover the coal reserves prior to
reclamation of the area. A single mine can cover as much as 1000 acres. Interview with
Larry Dusak, Assistant Manager, Skelly & Loy Consultants, in Lexington, Kentucky
(Feb. 18, 1987) [hereinafter cited as Dusak Interview].
11 Steep slope contour mining is practiced in the Appalachian coal fields where the
coal outcrops on a hillside with a slope in excess of twenty degrees. This method of
surface mining uses smaller and more mobile equipment than area mining and usually
covers much less surface area. Id. See generally SMCRA § 515(d)(4), 30 U.S.C. §
1265(d)(4) (1982).
32 SMCRA § 520(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982). See cases cited supra note
[VOL. 3:127
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citizens and small operators. In a similar context, Justice Powell
recognized that it "is totally unrealistic to assume that more
than a fraction of the persons and entities affected by a regu-
lation-especially small contractors scattered across the coun-
try-would have knowledge of its promulgation or familiarity
with or access to the Federal Register." 3 3 Even a small operator
which has notice of the regulation may not have the monetary
resources to bring a pre-enforcement challenge. Nevertheless,
that operator is barred from raising the validity of the regulation
as a defense during a subsequent enforcement hearing.
34
The barring of judical review may also be inequitable to
industry or environmental interest groups as a whole when the
rule slips past the sixty-day review period unchallenged. Al-
though it seems unlikely that significant rulemakings would not
be fully litigated by interested parties,35 a regulation is not always
tested on all grounds. 36 For example, 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2)
is a jurisdictional regulation promulgated under SMCRA37 that
defines the circumstances under which OSM can issue notices of
violations (NOV's)38 in states that have primacy over their sur-
face mining program.3 9 The validity of Section 843.12(a)(2) has
1 Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 290 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (discussing the thirty-day limitation on judicial review imposed by the Clean
Air Act).
' See cases cited supra note 9; see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944) (challenge of regulation under Emergency Price Control Act barred by 60-day
period).
1, See Verkuil, Congressional Limitations on Judicial Review of Rules, 57 TuL. L.
REv. 733, 757 n.93 (1983). Professor Verkuil argues that in environmental rulemakings
it is rare that a regulation will get by the judicial review period without being fully tested
by parties on both sides of the issue. Therefore, it is unlikely that the current challenger
could raise arguments that have not already been presented in one form or another. Id.
-m This occurrence may be more likely when the manner or impact of the rule's
application cannot be readily foreseen. See supra note 29.
37 Promulgated in final form at 47 Fed. Reg. 35,638 (1982). OSM has published
a proposed rule that would establish a standard for determining when a state regulatory
authority has taken "appropriate action" in response to notification of a possible
violation. 52 FED. REG. 34,050 (1987).
11 Section 843.12(a)(2) essentially provides that OSM shall issue a notice of viola-
tion when a violation of the Act or a permit condition is discovered during a federal
inspection in a state with enforcement primacy if the state falls to take appropriate
action within ten days after receiving written notice of the violation from the federal
inspector. 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) (1982).
19 Under SMCRA, a state can assume exclusive jurisdiction over surface coal mine
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been raised as a defense in enforcement proceedings on several
occasions, but the claims have been barred by the jurisdictional
limitations of Section 526(a)(1).4 Because of the nondiscretion-
ary nature of this type of regulation, 4' it seems repugnant to
constitutional principles to bar a court (especially one with en-
forcement jurisdiction) from considering an ultra vires challenge
to the regulation's validity. 42 The result is to render unreviewable
regulation and enforcement if it is demonstrated that the state has the capacity to meet
the provisions and purposes of the Act. SMCRA § 503(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982).
4 See, e.g., Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Department of the Interior of the United
States, 640 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Va. 1985), rev'd, 802 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1986);
Drummond Coal Co., Inc. v. Hodel, Civ. No. 85-AR-1411-S (N.D. Ala. June 6, 1985).
Several federal district courts have concluded that 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) provides for
enforcement power in excess of that authorized by Congress in SMCRA. See Clinchfield
Coal Co., 640 F. Supp. 334, 341 (W.D. Va. 1985) (the "regulation goes beyond the
scope of authority granted to OSM under the Act, and is in direct conflict with intent
of Congress . . . "), rev'd on other grounds, 802 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1986) (dismissed
based on lack of jurisdiction under SMCRA § 526(a)(1)); Drummond Coal, Civ. No.
85-AR-1411-S (N.D. Ala. June 5, 1985); Excello Coal Corp. v. Clark, Civ. No. 3-84-
904 (E.D. Tn. Dec. 27, 1984); see also In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation
Litig. (II), 653 F.2d 514, 518-19 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing the role of OSM in primacy
states as being primarily one of oversight and not direct involvement); Rulemaking
Petition submitted by the Mining and Reclamation Council of America, 51 FED. REG
27,197 (1986) (seeking repeal of 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2)) (repeal request denied on June
8, 1987 (52 FED. RE. 21,598 (1987))).
"1 Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) (an agency may not decide
with finality the limits of its own statutory power); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579,
582 (1958) (agency actions in excess of delegated powers do not "constitute exercises of
... [its] administrative discretion . . . "); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods. Inc., 322
U.S. 607, 616 (1944) ("The determination of the extent of authority given to a delegated
agency by Congress is not left for the decision of him in whom authority is vested.").
In Clinchfield Coal Co., 640 F. Supp. 334, the district court observed that:
The Secretary's regulation at 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) is not a substantive
regulation setting out requirements for mining operations. Rather, it is the
purported authority under which the Secretary has taken enforcement
action against Clinchfield Coal. If the Surface Mining Act has not provided
the Secretary with such authority, then his enforcement action cannot
stand.
Id. at 345 (decision on Motion for Reconsideration).
42 As Professor Berger has emphasized:
It is the function of the courts to insure that administrators do not act in
excess of jurisdiction. Implicit in the delegation, therefore, is the corollary
that courts must confine the administrator within the ambit of the conferred
jurisdiction at the call of one injured lest the delegated restrictions be set
at naught.
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 89
(1965). Concerning a total preclusion of judicial review of agency actions, the, court in
[VOL. 3:127
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a potential usurpation by an agency that went unnoticed through
the limited review period.
B. The Court's Role
Judicial inquiry is always available in some federal forum to
determine whether an act of Congress is consistent with consti-
tutional law. 43 A statutory provision such as Section 526(a)(1)
cannot be used to totally cut off review of whether the section
is being applied in a constitutional manner. 4 Separation of
powers principles mandate that the Court, and not Congress,
determine the extent to which judicial review of regulations can
constitutionally be restricted by statute.4 A party which is pre-
cluded from challenging the validity of a regulation by Section
526(a)(1) should have the opportunity on appeal of the district
court's ruling to show that application of the time restriction is
repugnant to its constitutional rights. Any claimant threatened
by the sixty-day limitation can also establish that the scope of
the preclusive statute does not extend to the circumstances of
the challenge at hand. 46
Constitutional concerns also arise when the party seeking to
attack the validity of a regulation does so as the defendant in
an enforcement proceeding.4 7 In this scenario, the sixty-day lim-
Fleming v. Moberly Milk Prods. Co., 160 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 786 (1947), stated that "[i]f the judiciary had no power in such matter, the only
practical restraint would be self-restraint of the executive branch .... [Sluch a result is
foreign to the concept of the division of powers of government." Id. at 265. Without
court review of the limits of agency action, "the individual is left to the absolutely
uncontrolled and arbitrary action of a public and administrative officer, whose action
is unauthorized by any law, and is in violation of the rights of the individual." American
School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110 (1902).
,1 Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 366 n.7 (1974); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.").
- The courts must have the final say in the matter, not Congress. Marbury, 5
U.S. at 177.
41 See cases cited supra note 44. Cf. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality decision).
" Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 582 (1958) (A court has "jurisdiction to
determine its jurisdiction.").
11 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 467-68 (1944) (P. Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). See generally BATOR, MIsHKIN, SiiAPIMo, & WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S
TI FEDERAL COURTS AND TE FEDERAL SYSTEM 330-75 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter BATOR].
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itation does not act to bar the Article III court of all jurisdiction
because the court has jurisdiction to enforce the Secretary's order
of a civil penalty.45 Article III empowers Congress to remove
jurisdiction from a lower federal court 4 9 but separation of pow-
ers principles may not allow Congress to bar a court from
considering certain matters while otherwise deciding a case.5 0
Effectively, Congress has done just that with SMCRA; district
courts are barred from considering any claims concerning the
validity of the underlying regulation while deciding whether to
enforce a penalty or other sanction."
II. SCOPE OF PRECLUSION UNDER SECTION 526(A)(1)
Congress' intent to restrict judicial review of some agency
rulemakings is clear in Section 526(a)(1). What is not so clear is
the specific types of rules52 and challenges53 that are encompassed
" Under Section 526(a)(1) of SMCRA, orders issued by the Secretary in a civil
penalty or other formal adjudication are subject to judicial review in district court. 30
U.S.C. § 1276(a)(2) (1982). The defendant in such a proceeding is still precluded from
raising the validity of a regulation as a defense if the sixty-day review period has expired.
SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982).
49 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 241-251 and accompanying text. See generally BATOR, supra note
47, at 336-41.
5l See SMCRA §§ 526(a)(1), (2), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1276(a)(1), (2) (1982).
11 The APA defines a "rule" as "an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy .. ." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982). Substantive rules can be characterized as legis-
lative or interpretive. Professor Davis describes the distinction as follows. "A legislative
rule is the product of an exercise of delegated legislative power to make law through
rules. An interpretive rule is any rule any agency issues without exercising delegated
legislative power to make law through rules." 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 7.8, at 36 (1979). The distinction is important because legislative rules, such as
performance standards, are given more deference by courts during review than are
interpretive rules. Id. Interpretive rules are not binding on courts. Id. at 36, 59. An
agency regulation that further defines the limits of the agency's own statutory authority
is treated as an interpretive rule. See supra note 41. 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) clearly
falls into this category. See supra notes 38-40.
" Under APA § 706(2), a reviewing court can invalidate a rule promulgated
through the informal notice and comment process if it is found to be:
A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law;
B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
D) without observance of procedure required by law [§ 5531.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D) (1982).
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by the sixty-day preclusion.54 Ascertaining the intended scope of
the section is critical because it bears directly on the section's
constitutionality. The scope of the review restriction must be
determined from the plain language of the statute, the section's
role within SMCRA's statutory design, the legislative history of
the section, and case law interpreting analogous statutory pro-
visions."
Several basic tenents of statutory interpretation have evolved
for construing statutory language that attempts to limit judicial
review.5 6 Regulations are presumed to be reviewable, and courts
interpret statutory review restrictions narrowly.57 Access to ju-
dicial review will be restricted "only upon a showing of 'clear
and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent.''58 If
the statutory scheme is silent as to the availability of review of
a certain type of final agency action, the action is generally
deemed reviewable. 59 Courts are most apt to interpret review
1 Compare Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Department of Interior of the United States,
640 F. Supp. 334, 338 (W.D. Va. 1985) (attack on statutory authority of enforcement
regulation not barred by Section 526(a)(1)) with Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d
469, 473 n.5 (l1th Cir. 1984) (all regulations with national impact are subject to the
jurisdictional restrictions in § 526(a)(1)) and Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 655 F.2d
732, 738 (6th Cir. 1981) (no "clear and convincing evidence" exists to support a broad
scope of exclusion under the sixty-day limitation).
" Southern R.R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 462 (1979)
(finding "clear and convincing evidence" of congressional intent to preclude all judicial
review of the ICC's decision not to investigate rate increases under Section 15(8) of the
Interstate Commerce Act).
56 See generally, BREER & STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY POLICY,
1055-57 (2d ed. 1985).
17 Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962) ("The broadly remedial provisions
of the [APA] will not be precluded in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of
congressional intent.") Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1970).
"1 Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 141. But see Block v. Community Nutrition
Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 354 (1984) (Clear and convincing in this context is met, and the
presumption favoring review overcome, when the intent to preclude is "fairly discernable
in the statutory scheme.").
19 San Juan Legal Servs., Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 655 F.2d 434, 438 (1st Cir.
1981) (finding that the silence in the statute and legislative history on the issue of judicial
review does not indicate intent to preclude review) (citing Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S.
288, 309-10 (1944)); Commonwealth of Virginia v. Marshall, 599 F.2d 588, 592 (4th Cir.
1979) (preclusion of review will not be implied from statutory silence); see also Consumer
Fed'n of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 515 F.2d 367, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(holding that clear and convincing evidence of intent to preclude review can be provided
by the legislative history when the statute is silent as to review).
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restrictions narrowly when serious questions concerning the con-
stitutionality of the provision would otherwise be at issue. 6" In
sum, judicial review of agency actions is favored at law and will
only be restricted by the clearest intentions of Congress, and
sometimes not even then.
61
The sixty-day limitation on review in Section 526(a)(1) of
SMCRA applies to "any action subject to judicial review under
this subsection .... -62 The section refers to three categories of
actions as being subject to judicial review:
[1] Any action by the Secretary to approve or disapprove a
State program or to prepare or promulgate a Federal program
[2] any action by the Secretary promulgating national rules or
regulations including standards pursuant to sections 501, 515,
516, and 523 ...
[3] any other action constituting rulemaking by the Secre-
tary .... 63
On its face, Section 526(a)(1) does not clearly specify the
types of regulations or challenges to which the sixty-day limit
applies. 64 Rather, the section characterizes actions for venue
w Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974) (quoting United States v.
Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971)) ("[It is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the constitutional questions may be avoided.") (construing the statute to allow
for judicial review of constitutional issues); see also Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,
109 (1977).
61 Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581-83 (1958) (Even though the statute clearly
precluded judicial review of the Secretary of Army's findings related to discharge, the
Court construed the statute to allow for review of whether the Secretary acted within
its jurisdiction.). For a critical analysis of a broad presumption of judicial review, see
Verkuil, Congressional Limitations on Judicial Review of Rules, 57 TuL. L. REv. 733,
773 n.155 (1983).
SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982).
63 Id. Section 501 of SMCRA requires the Secretary to issue regulations covering
mining and reclamation performance standards. 30 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982). Section 515
specifies the minimum requirements for general performance standards. 30 U.S.C. §
1265(b) (1982). Section 516 relates to special performance standards for underground
mining operations. 30 U.S.C. § 1266 (1982). And finally, Section 523 provides for
regulations pursuant to a Federal Lands Program. 30 U.S.C. § 1273 (1982).
, The first category of actions which applies to approval or disapproval of a
state's program does not include the types of national regulations with which this Note
is concerned. Therefore, the second and third categories of actions are examined in light
of the other modifying language in Section 526(a)(1) to ascertain the types of regulations
and challenges that are within the preclusive scope.
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purposes. 65 The second category of actions in Section 526(a)(1)
encompasses the promulgation of national guidelines and per-
formance standards which establish the criteria for mining and
reclamation operations." OSM is granted much discretion in
making substantive regulations of this type, 67 but the reference
to specific types of national performance standards leaves some
doubt that this category includes interpretive enforcement regu-
lations. 68 The section's legislative history, however, indicates that
all types of regulations with national impact are included in the
restriction and specific reference to standards in Sections 501,
515, 516, and 523 is superfluous emphasis of the primary per-
formance standard regulations. 69 The legislative history is by no
means clear on this issue as this interpretation is based on a
relatively minor unexplained change of the section by the Con-
ference Committee.
70
61 See H. R. REp. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1977); S. REP. No. 337,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1977). For full text of the section see supra note 11.
- In his dissent in Holmes Limestone Co., 456 U.S. 995 (1982) (denying certiorari),
Justice White recognized that Section 526(a)(1) "provides that regulations with national
impact be reviewed in the District of Columbia, those with a statewide impact in the
district court for the district of the capital of the state involved, and all other regulations
only in the district where the surface mining operation at issue is located."
Id. at 996 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (emphasis added).
67 In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 456 F. Supp. 1301, 1308-09 (D.D.C.
1978) (Secretary has broad discretion in using either design criteria or performance
standards to achieve the purposes of the Act). Section 526(a)(1) specifies that review
shall be based on an arbitrary and capricious standard, nearly as deferential a review as
is ever afforded. 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982).
" In fact, Sections 517(h)(2) and 502(e) which provide for inspection regulations
and a federal enforcement program are not referenced in Section 526(a)(1). However,
reference to Sections 501, 515, 516 and 523 within Section 526(a)(1) does not appear to
be exclusive, but only for special emphasis. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1252(e), 1267(h)(2) (1986).
0 An earlier version of H.R. 2 specified that "any action by the Secretary pro-
mulgating standards pursuant to sections 501, 515(e), 516, and 523 shall be subject to
judicial review .. " H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1977); see also S.
REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1977). The language was subsequently changed
to: "promulgating national rules or regulations including standards pursuant to. .. "
30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (emphasis added). See S. REP. No. 337, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 75
(1977). Thus, the inserted language seems to broaden the scope of rulemaking review to
include any type of rules that have national impact. The House Committee Report on
H.R. 2 noted that "the Secretary's actions national in scope (such as promulgation of
general regulations) will be subject to review. H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 70 (1977).
7o See supra note 83; see also Drummond Coal, 735 F.2d at 474 ("Unexplained
changes made in committee are not reliable indicators of congressional intent.").
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The third category of actions subject to the sixty-day restric-
tion could be viewed as a catchall provision which authorizes
judicial review of all other types of rulemakings not encompassed
by the first two categories. Such a reading of the provision,
however, is strained. More likely, this category was intended as
a venue provision relating to rulemakings aimed at individual
surface mine operations. 7' This narrower reading of the third
category is consistent with the venue policy of keeping review
of regulations with national impact in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.
72
A reading of Section 526(a)(1) that excludes jurisdictional-
based challenges from the scope of the subsection's venue
provisions73 is supported by the grounds specified for invalidat-
ing actions subject to judicial review under the subsection. 74 The
"arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law"
standard is generally the key basis for testing the substance of
discretionary rulemakings of performance standards. 75 Con-
versely, jurisdictional and enforcement regulations are commonly
suspect under Section 706(2)(B) and (C) of the APA. 76 That
Section 526(a)(1) refers only to the limited grounds of invalida-
tion supports the contention that Congress intended Section
526(a)(1) to apply only to discretionary rulemakings of national
See H.R. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1977); see also Holmes Limestone
Co., 456 U.S. at 995 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that the
third category establishes that regulations aimed at individual mines were reviewable
"only in the district where the surface mining operation at issue is located").
72 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
7 This proposition means that Congress was only referring to performance stand-
ards (i.e., legislative regulations) within the venue and time restrictions of the section.
4 "Any action subject to judicial review under this subsection shall be affirmed
unless the court concludes that such action is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise incon-
sistent with law." SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982).
7, See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (The arbitrary and capricious standard of review "is narrow, and a court
is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."); see also Citizens To Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (Arbitrary and capricious review
requires the court to consider "whether the decision was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.").
-6 These subsections provide that agency actions must be set aside if found to be
contrary to constitutional right or in excess of statutory authority. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(B),
(C) (1982). See also Harmon, 355 U.S. at 581-82 (agency does not have discretion in
defining limits of its statutory authority); cases cited supra note 41.
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standards and not interpretive jurisdictional or enforcement reg-
ulations. 77 The limited grounds of invalidation may also imply
that Congress did not intend to restrict judicial review when the
challenge is based on constitutional or other grounds. 7 Congress
knows how to exclude these fundamental types of claims in the
statutory language when it so desires.
79
Congress' primary concern in establishing the venue and time
restrictions on review in Section 526(a)(1) was to promote defin-
itive, uniform performance standards for regulating the mining
industry.80 Restricting the reviewability of jurisdictional regula-
tions that define the contours of an agency's authority does not
necessarily further these goals.8 1 They are furthered, however,
77 S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1977) states:
Because of the thoroughness and degree of due process afforded judicially
reviewable actions by the Secretary, judicial review is to be based on the
record made before the Secretary. The courts should render their decisions
on the basis of whether or not the Secretary's decision was arbitrary and
capricious or supported by the record.
Id. See supra note 79.
" Note that challenges based on these grounds are provided for in different
subsections of APA section 706 from the subsection providing for arbitrary and capri-
cious review. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982) with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B), (C)
(1982). See supra note 53.
" See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1652(d) (1982). Under
this Act, Congress specifically required that "claims alleging that an action will deny
rights under the Constitution of the United States, or that the action is beyond the scope
of this chapter, may be brought within sixty days following the date of such action."
Id. See also Verkuil, supra note 61 at 756.
- SMCRA § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 120 (1982). See also Holmes Limestone Co., 456
U.S. at 997 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that Congress
intended that there be uniform national performance standards); Commonwealth of
Virginia ex rel. Virginia Dept. of Conservation and Economic Dev. v. Watt, 741 F.2d
37, 40-41 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that Congress' intent was to foreclose the possibility
of conflicting decisions on the validity of national mining regulations).
11 The substance of national performance standards is not threatened by a challenge
to a regulation delineating federal enforcement authority. See Chrysler Corp. v. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 600 F.2d 904, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The legislative history
of the Clear Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(h) (1976), is instructive as to
Congress' intent in designing the jurisdictional restrictions in the various environmental
statutes. Chrysler Corp., 600 F.2d at 911. The Chrysler Corp. Court observed that the
legislative objective of the review restrictions was to:
limit judicial review as to forum and time so as to assure expeditious,
authoritative and central judicial resolution of issues which were national
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by cutting off all challenges to performance standards .
2
Judicial interpretations of similar statutory provisions that
seek to restrict the period of judicial review of agency actions,
shied away from giving the provisions an all-inclusive reading.1
3
In State of Texas v. United States,84 the scope of a sixty-day
restriction on review of agency orders under the Hobbs Act was
considered by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.8 5 The court
held that although the sixty-day limit barred the State of Texas
from attacking the procedure under which the rules were pro-
mulgated, the Hobbs Act did not bar a challenge of the statutory
authority for adopting the rule. 6 The same judicial approach
has been taken by other courts to permit review of an agency's
statutory authority for promulgating a particular rule despite the
existence of a time restriction on challenges within the organic
statute. 7 These cases illustrate that the type of challenge being
made plays an important role in whether the restriction should
apply.
88
in impact and which could hold up the timely accomplishment of the Act's
objectives if not settled at the outset .... The purpose Congress declared
is much more easily fitted to standards and testing than to an enforcement
scheme ...
Id. at 911-12 (quoting in part from Brief for Respondents at 9-10).
02 Allowing challenges to national performance standards on constitutional or ultra
vires grounds will thwart these goals; if the challenge is successful, the regulation must
be struck.
11 See State of Texas v. United States, 749 F.2d 1144, 1146 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631-32 (6th
Cir. 1978); Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 1002, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 1980);
see also Natural Resource Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n., 666 F.2d
595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959).
94 749 F.2d 1144.
8, Id. at 1146. The Hobbs Act section at issue provided that a party aggrieved by
a regulation or final order must petition for judicial view within sixty days. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2342, 2344 (1982).
" State of Texas, 749 F.2d at 1146 (citing Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n., 666 F.2d
at 602).
" See cases cited supra note 84; Harmon, 355 U.S. at 582 (Review restriction must
be read to be harmonious with statutory authority "to the end that the basis on which
the Secretary's action is reviewed is coterminous with the basis on which he is allowed
to act."); see also Trans-Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 638-39 n.17 (holding
that the courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges that the ICC exceeded its statutory
authority in issuing orders even though they are precluded from challenging the reason-
ableness of rates).
" See cases cited supra note 83. The Supreme Court also tends to find that
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Neither the language of Section 526(a)(1) nor its legislative
history present clear and convincing evidence that Congress in-
tended the sixty-day time restriction on judicial review to apply
to challenges of jurisdictional regulations such as 30 C.F.R. §
842.12(a)(2) or to govern challenges based on constitutional
grounds.8 9 Without convincing proof of such congressional in-
tent, judicial review should be available. 90 Nevertheless, a broad
reading of Section 526(a)(1) is possible, and courts are likely to
disagree on the scope issue. 91 The Secretary's broad interpreta-
tion of the section is entitled to significant deference. 92 There-
fore, the constitutional implications of such a broad reading
must be examined.
III. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
Even though Congress has the power to limit the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts, 93 it seems grossly unfair to forbid a
party failing to meet the sixty-day period from challenging a
regulation in some situations. 94 Although the APA offers no
statutory review restrictions do not preclude constitutionally based challenges. Califano
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977) (The Court "will not read a statutory scheme to
take the 'extraordinary' step of foreclosing jurisdiction [of constitutional issues] unless
Congress' intent to do so is manifested by 'clear and convincing' evidence."). See also
Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 621-22 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (find that constitutional challenges
to Commission settlements under the Micronesian Claims Act of 1971 were not barred
by provision stating that such settlements were final and conclusive and not subject to
review).
'9 See supra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
" See cases cited supra note 54.
92 Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U.S.
64, 83 (1980).
91 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
- Justice Powell recognized the potential unfairness of quick-fused statutes of
limitations on reviewing agency actions in his concurring opinion in Adamo Wrecking
Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978) where he wrote:
The 30-day limitation on judicial review imposed by the Clean Air Act
would afford precariously little time for many affected persons even if
some adequate method of notice were afforded. It also is totally unrealistic
to assume that more than a fraction of the persons and entities affected
by a regulation-especially small contractors scattered across the country-
would have knowledge of its promulgation or familiarity with or access to
the Federal Register ....
Id. at 290 (Powell, J., concurring).
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procedural protection to a challenger barred by statute, 95 the
fifth amendment's due process clause may require that a party
be afforded an opportunity to seek court review. 96 Judicial re-
view should be available to assess a party's due process conten-
tions despite the expiration of the statutory period.
97
Due process concerns with Section 526(a)(1) arise in several
situations. Such concerns most frequently surface when the party
seeking to challenge a regulation had no previous opportunity9"
or reason" to bring suit during the statutory review period. Due
process issues are not as significant in pre-enforcement rulemak-
ing challenges as they are in adjudications'0° because rulemakings
are based on legislative policy'0 1 decisions that generally apply
to many individuals. 0 2 The APA's notice and comment
91 The APA expressly acknowledges that Congress may completely preclude judicial
review. 5 U.S.C. § 701(1) (1982).
' As Justice Brandeis has stated:
If there be any controversy to which the judicial power extends that may
not be subjected to the conclusive determination of administrative bod-
ies .... [I]t is not because of any prohibition against the diminution of
the jurisdiction of the federal district courts as such, but because, under
certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a
requirement of judicial process.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Londoner
v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908) (stating that in some circumstances due process
requires that an individual be given an opportunity to challenge an ordinance). Cf.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 542 (1978) (Under some exceptional circumstances, due process may mandate
that an individual be afforded more procedural protection in an informal rulemaking
proceeding than is provided under the APA.).
' See cases cited supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
101 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). See also
1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 7.02 (1958) (Agencies are often the
"masters of legislative facts" and such facts do not concern the personal activities of
businesses or individuals which are often disputed in adjudications.).
1o The vast majority of regulations promulgated under SMCRA are aimed at coal
operators in general and mining methods in particular geographic regions. OSM regu-
lations are not aimed at selected operations on an individual basis. McGraw Interview,
supra note 20.
l*1 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 239 U.S. at 445 ("Where a rule of conduct applies to more
than a few people it is impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its
adoption.... There must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if govern-
ment is to go on.") (distinguishing Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1980) because
of the relatively small number of persons affected by the tax assessment in that due
process case). See also K. DAVIS, supra note 100, at § 7.02.
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provisions 1°3 and the sixty-day review period under Section
526(a)(1) go a long way toward protecting due process rights
even though the affected party may not have been motivated to
challenge the regulation when promulgated.' l 4 Nevertheless, due
process concerns are heightened when the party seeking review
of the regulation is the defendant in an enforcement proceeding
who did not have proper prior opportunity to challenge the
adverse rule. ,05 This is especially true where the challenge is based
on constitutional grounds.' °6 Even in this setting, however, it is
likely that someone has thoroughly tested the regulation in ques-
tion during the statutory review period.'0 7
In Yakus v. United States,08 the issue was presented whether
invoking a sixty-day time restriction on judicial review of regu-
lations adopted under the Emergency Price Control Act'09 de-
prived petitioners of due process. The statutory review period
had expired, and the district court barred petitioners from chal-
lenging the validity of the regulation in an enforcement proceed-
ing. 10 On appeal, the claimants argued that their due process
rights were violated because the sixty-day limit on review was
inadequate for filing a protest."' In a decision from which three
Justices dissented, the Court held that, under the circumstances
,03 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1977).
- Professor Verkuil argues that the APA's notice and comment procedures are
more than sufficient to protect a party's due process rights even though the party had
no notice or opportunity to participate in the rulemaking. Individual procedural rights
are not compatible with the legislative process, but individuals are still protected via the
general participation of those interested parties who are involved in the proceedings.
Verkuil, supra note 61, at 756 n.88.
10, Cf. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385 (1908) (holding that individuals assessed with
tax for paving street via a city ordinance have right to be heard and present proof). See
also supra note 94 and infra text accompanying notes 164-168.
1 Adamo Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. at 289-90 (Powell, J., concurring). See also
infra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
'o, Verkuil, supra note 61, at 757 n.93.
321 U.S. 414 (1944).
119 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 204(d), 56 Stat. 23 (repealed 1947).
110 The petitioners raised the question specifically reserved in Lockerty v. Phillips,
319 U.S. 182 (1943): whether the validity of a regulation can be challenged in an
enforcement proceeding although it had not been tested by petitioners during the sta-
tutory review period. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 419 (1944).
" Yakus, 321 U.S. at 431.
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of the case, the statute was capable of protecting the petitioner's
rights."12 The Court qualified its holding by stating that:
only if we could say in advance of resort to the statutory
procedure that it is incapable of affording due process to
petitioners could we conclude that they have shown any legal
excuse for their failure to resort to it or that their constitutional
rights have been or will be infringed." 3
Yakus establishes that the right to challenge the validity of
a regulation may be forfeited by failing to file the claim within
the period mandated by statute. " 4 The Court indicated, however,
that statutory restrictions on the availability of judicial review
may not be constitutionally applied in all instances." 5 First,
although a sixty-day limit appears to be procedurally sufficient
on its face, a lesser period may at some point become inade-
quate.1 6 Second, the Court hinted that due process may be
violated if the claimant can show a legal excuse as to why it had
no opportunity to challenge during the statutory review period.'7
The majority opinion in Yakus declined to rule on the question
of whether the constitutionality of the regulation could be raised
in a criminal enforcement proceeding after the sixty-day period
has run."' Modern courts have also avoided this last issue." 9
2 ld. at 435 (The sixty-day period allowed for protest "cannot be said to be
unreasonably short in view of the urgency and exigencies of wartime price regulation.").
"I Id. (emphasis added). The Court further noted that "[nlo reason is advanced
why petitioners could not, throughout the statutory proceeding, raise and preserve any
due process objection to the statute, the regulations, or the procedure. Id. at 437.
" See id. at 435.
11 Id.
16 The Court examined the length of the period as balanced against the legitimate
concerns of Congress and concluded that "the authorized procedure is not incapable of
affording the protection to petitioners' rights required by due process." Id.
"' See supra note 137. At least it seems that the Court would balance any legal
excuse as to why an earlier challenge could not be made against the legislative and public
interests advanced by the judicial review restriction. See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 437. Upon
its promulgation, the regulation immediately affected the petitioners in Yakus; and thus,
they had reason and opportunity to challenge the regulations within the sixty-day period.
Contrast these conditions to the scenarios developed supra notes 24-32 and accompanying
text. See also infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
"S The Court stated: "[w]e have no occasion to decide whether one charged with
criminal violation of a duly promulgated price regulation may defend on the ground
that the regulation is unconstitutional on its face." Yakus, 321 U.S. at 446-47.
19 Cf. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977); Johnson v. Robinson, 415
U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974) (construing statute not to preclude review of constitutional
challenges to regulations).
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Possibly, the basis of the regulatory challenge bears on the
degree of judicial review opportunity that must be afforded.
20
Yakus seems to support the constitutionality of applying the
Section 526(a)(1) sixty-day bar against any individual who was
under potential threat of injury or impact from a particular
regulation at the time of its adoption.' 2' Yakus can, however,
be read to leave the due process issue open as to individuals
who had no real opportunity to challenge the regulation during
the sixty-day period. 122 This possibility has been addressed in
other cases by members of the Court'23 and by lower federal
courts. 12
Another factor in this analysis is the type of interest the
petitioner has at stake in the proceedings. 125 In Bowles v. Wil-
lingham,126 the Court reinforced its Yakus 27 holding that Con-
gress could restrict judicial review of agency regulations where
the review period provided is adequate. 128 Justice Rutledge con-
curred in the decision but explained that:
[d]ifferent considerations, in part, determine this question from
those controlling when enforcement is by criminal sanc-
1'o Yakus, 321 U.S. at 446-47. See cases cited supra note 119.
2 Yakus, 321 U.S. at 434-37.
' Id. See infra notes 164-68 for discussion of what is proper "opportunity."
,23 Adamo Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. at 290 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the
thirty-day limitation on judicial review under the Clean Air Act "would afford precar-
iously little time for many affected persons even if some adequate method of notice
were afforded"); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 526 (1944) (Rutledge, J., con-
curring) (Congress can restrict review of regulations that affect economic interests as
long as "the previous opportunity [is] adequate for the purpose prescribed, in the
constitutional sense.").
'1' Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 655 F.2d 732, 738 (6th Cir. 1981) (questioning
the propriety of enforcing a sixty-day review limitation against an operator who had no
knowledge of the adoption of the regulations); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169
F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (stating that despite Congress' power to testrict the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, it cannot exercise that power to deprive any
person of property without due process of law).
"I See Bowles, 321 U.S. at 525 (criminal sanctions more compelling than economic
impact) (Rutledge, J., concurring). Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)
(stating that due process was flexible and one factor to be considered in the analysis
was the private interest that was affected by the government action).
321 U.S. 503 (1944).
27 Yakus, 321 U.S. at 434-37.
" Bowles, 321 U.S. at 520 (whether due process required provisions for hearings
prior to the Administrator's settling of rent rates through orders or regulations).
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tion. . . . Since in these cases the rights involved are rights of
property, not of personal liberty or life as in criminal proceed-
ings, the consquences, though serious, are not of the same
moment under our system, as appears from the fact they are
not secured by the same procedural protections in trial. It is
in this respect perhaps that our basic law, following the com-
mon law, most clearly places the rights to life and to liberty
above those of property.
129
When a regulation's validity is attacked as a defense in an
enforcement action, preclusion of the challenge as untimely seems
contrary to due process rights. 30 Under SMCRA, the defendant
in an enforcement proceeding may be facing a substantial civil
penalty,' revocation of its surface mining permit,"32 or impris-
onment.'33 In this situation, a defendant has a "property"' 34 or
"liberty' ' 3 5 interest at stake, yet is not given hearing rights on
"all" issues if the sixty-day review period has expired. 36 The
reviewing court is apparently barred from hearing challenges to
the underlying regulation's validity.
3 7
When the interests at stake are protected by the fifth
or fourteenth amendments,' 38 court review should be avail-
able to ascertain whether the individual was afforded suffi-
cient due process before'39 being deprived of these inter-
,2 Bowles, 321 U.S, at 525 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
130 See BATOR, supra note 47, at 336-38.
" SMCRA § 518(a)-(g), 30 U.S.C. § 1268(a)-(g) (1982).
132 SMCRA § 521(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a) (1982).
-3 SMCRA § 518(e), (f), (g), 30 U.S.C. § 1268(e), (f), (g) (1982).
114 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972)
("property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual
ownership of real estate, chattels, or money"). Clearly, both the imposition of fines and
revocation of a mining license impinge on protected property interests. Id.
'- Freedom from bodily restraint is the most fundamental of the liberty interests
protected by the due process clause. Id. at 572.
136 Although hearing rights are afforded under SMCRA § 526(a)(2), the sixty-day
preclusion of Section 526(a)(1) will bar an untimely challenge to the validity of the
underlying regulation. 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1), (2) (1986); Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Hodel,
No. 85-2206 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 1986); Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469, 472-
76 (11th Cir. 1984).
" See cases cited supra note 136.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV.
"' Post-deprivation procedures are sometimes adequate to protect one's due process
rights, especially in light of important governmental interests. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 520-
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ests.'"1 Congress can decide whether or not to create a prop-
erty right in a particular area, but the courts must rule on the
procedures Congress establishes to revoke these rights.''
Traditionally, courts apply the Mathews v. Eldridge42 bal-
ancing test to determine if the procedures provided by statute
for revoking a right are constitutionally adequate. 143 This bal-
ancing illustrates that due process hearing rights are not abso-
lute,'" and that the procedural protection due is based on the
interests at stake.' 45 The Mathews test is most frequently used
21 (finding that opportunity to challenge rent fixing order after its effective date is
sufficient); Phillips v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931) ("Where
only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial inquiry is not a
denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination
of the liability is adequate."). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 678 (1977)
(holding that common law civil sanctions afford sufficient protection to students against
"unjustified corporal punishment" by school officials).
The due process concern under SMCRA § 526(a)(1) is not the timing of the hearing
in relation to the deprivation, but the scope of what can be challenged at the hearing.
As Justice Marshall has recognized, "due process requires that a hearing be held 'at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 212
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
,o Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985). In
Loudermill, the Court firmly rejected the contention that the Legislature could define
the procedures for depriving an individual of an entitlement which it created by statute.
Id. Once it is established that a property right exists, the court's role is to determine
"what process is due." Id. at 541. See also Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part) (Six Justices rejected the "bitter with the sweet" approach advocated
by Justice Rehnquist.).
"I Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 540-41.
142 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
" Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543 (reciting the three factors in the Mathews test). In
Mathews, the Court established the following three prong test to determine what process
is due.
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S at 335.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
"' At least where property interests are at stake, courts apply the Mathews balancing
test to determine what procedural protection should be provided for "the generality of
cases" of that type, "not the rare exceptions." Id. at 344. This wholesale approach may
not be appropriate when fundamental liberty interests are at stake. See Lassiter v.
Department of Social Sec. Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S 18, 31-32 (1981) (child
custody rights at stake); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (prisoners
facing involuntary transfer to a mental hospital).
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to determine what type of procedural safeguards are required to
insure a sufficiently accurate decision before depriving a party
of a protected interest. 14 These same factors can also be appli-
cable to ascertain whether the scope 47 of the hearing provided
sufficiently protects one's due process rights. 41 In fact, the Ma-
thews test considerations are very similar to factors advanced by
Justice Rutledge in his Bowles v. Willingham149 concurrence for
evaluating due process concerns when Congress has restricted
the availability of judicial review.150 The same types of factors 5'
could be considered by the courts in determining whether the
scope of review provided under SMCRA is adequate 5 2 under the
circumstances of the case.'53
"4 See generally Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Admin-
istrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 28, 30 (1976).
14, In an enforcement proceeding, the court will hear all of the defendant's defenses
except those based on a challenge to the underlying regulation's validity. Although the
"type" of procedural safeguard is clearly sufficient (i.e., an appeal to U.S. District
Court following an administrative hearing), the scope of the appeal may be inadequate
to protect the defendant's due process rights.
141 See Note, Congressional Preclusion of Judicial Review of Federal Benefit Dis-
bursement: Reasserting Separation of Powers, 97 HARV. L. REv. 778, 788-89 (1984). In
both scenarios, Congress has established the procedures to be used to revoke a property
right and the courts' role is to determine whether the procedural system established is
sufficient in a due process sense. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 540-41.
1,9 321 U.S. 503.
11 Id. at 526. Justice Rutledge reasoned that Congress can restrict judicial review
of the validity of a regulation in a civil enforcement action subject to the following
limitations:
(1) The order or regulation must not be invalid on its face; (2) the previous
opportunity must be adequate for the purpose prescribed, in the constitu-
tional sense; and (3) ... the circumstances and nature of the substantive
problem dealt with by the legislation must be such that they justify both
the creation of the special remedy and the requirement that it be followed
to the exclusion of others normally available.
Id. (Rutledge, J., concurring).
',' See supra note 143.
2 If the enforcement court is barred by statute from entertaining challenges to the
validity of a regulation, the due process question is whether the prior judicial review
period (e.g., sixty days) provided the defendant with sufficient notice and opportunity
to be heard under the circumstances. See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 434-37; see also supra
notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
'3 This type of analysis should not be subject to a "wholesale" balancing approach
because the risk of erroneous deprivation under the procedural framework is not in
issue. Rather, the due process claim is based on one's opportunity to be heard which
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The first factor considered in the Mathews test is the type
of "interest that will be affected by the official action."' 5 4 The
threat of civil penalties is not as compelling an interest to be
protected as is revocation of a permit'55 or criminal sanctions. 1
6
If the defendant in an enforcement hearing under SMCRA faces
criminal liabilty, the court should be more concerned about the
defendant's prior opportunity to challenge the regulation's valid-
ity during the sixty-day review period.
5 7
The second factor, "risk of erroneous deprivation"' 58 exists
if a party is precluded from challenging the validity of a regu-
lation where it appears that the regulation in question is flawed. 59
If a court had previously reviewed the regulation in a challenge
brought by another party and rejected the claim on the merits,
the risk of erronerous deprivation is slight.'16 Where a regulation
goes through the review period unchallenged, however, the risk
could be high.
161
can be very case specific. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text. A case-by-case
analysis of the Mathews factors is appropriate where "it is neither possible nor prudent"
to attempt to formulate adequate procedures by a wholesale approach to be used in
every instance because "the facts and circumstances are susceptible of almost infinite
variation." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790
(1973)).
1" Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
5 SMCRA § 521(b)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(b)(4) (1982). Once an operator has had
a permit revoked under SMCRA, it is precluded from ever obtaining another permit at
any other site. SMCRA § 510(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1260(c) (1982). Revocation of a permit
pursuant to a finding of a willful pattern of violations in an enforcement proceeding
can therefore be fatal to a coal mining company.
15 See, e.g., SMCRA § 518(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1268(e) (1982). As Justice Stephens has
noted: "the value of protecting our liberty from deprivation by the State without due
process of law is priceless." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 60 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
'5' But see Yakus, 321 U.S. at 434-37. See supra notes 110-22 and accompanying
text.
'5, Mathews, 424 U.S at 335. The type of error in question here, however, is not
the same as in Mathews where the potential error was one of applying fact to law (i.e.,
was the individual entitled to the benefit). In the context of a statutory restriction on
judicial review, the risk of error is that the regulation under which the defendant is
being fined or disciplined is unconstitutional or invalid on other grounds.
"I See, e.g., discussion concerning the validity of 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2), supra
notes 37-40.
160 For example, another party or association that was involved in the rulemaking
may have unsuccessfully challenged the rule on the applicable gamut of APA § 706(2)
grounds.
161 See, e.g., discussion concerning 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) supra note 40. But cf.
Verkuil, supra note 35.
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The risk of erroneous deprivation may also depend on the
type of claim being raised. Where the claim is aimed at a
discretionary act, it is more likely that the agency action will
withstand judicial scrutiny. 62 Allowing a first time challenge to
a regulation in an enforcement proceeding despite the expiration
of the statutory review period will essentially remove all risk of
an erroneous deprivation of the claimant's property or liberty
rights.
The risk of erroneous deprivation may also be increased
when the petitioner had no reasonable opportunity to challenge
the regulation during the statutory period.' 63 Notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential elements of due process
that protect against unfair, arbitrary, and mistaken government
action. 1' Merely being engaged in the industry at the time a rule
is promulgated should not necessarily establish that a sufficient
opportunity to challenge existed. For a person to have had a
meaningful opportunity to challenge a rule, that person must
have been under a potential threat of being affected by operation
of the rule at the time it was promulgated. In this regard, if a
person would not meet either the "injury in fact" or "zone of
interests" requirements of the traditional standing test, 165 the
person did not have any meaningful opportunity to challenge
the regulation during the review period. The sufficiency of the
prior opportunity to challenge a regulation should be determined
by the motivation'" for doing so that existed at that prior time. 67
12 A challenge aimed at the substance of a regulation is less likely to be successful
because of the broad discretion given to an agency in promulgating performance stand-
ards. See supra note 67. A court will give much less deference to an agency action in
deciding whether it exceeded its jurisdictional authority or acted in an unconstitutional
manner. See supra note 41. In a sense, the distinction is based on a court's traditional
role in deciding issues of law de novo while allowing the agency to control on ordinary
issues of fact finding, especially concerning facts within the agency's area of expertise.
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 48-49 (1932). The differing levels of scrutiny are
reflected in the various review standards of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(F) (1982).
63 See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
16 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972).
161 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
66 See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
16' Even though a reason for challenging a regulation may not clearly exist at the
time the regulation is promulgated, a business impact may be foreseeable to the extent
that a sufficient opportunity is deemed to have existed. For example, an eastern Kentucky
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A party's due process interests are certainly at their peak when
no prior opportunity to challenge existed because the claimant
only came into existence after the review period had lapsed.
6 8
The third- factor considered in the Mathews due process
balance is "the [g]overnment's interest including ... the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute pro-
cedural requirement would entail.' ' 69 The government's interests
in restricting the review of national performance standards is
significant. 70 It is essential to the efficient and uniform enforce-
ment of the regulatory program of SMCRA that performance
standards be established with finality. 17' The same strong inter-
ests do not apply to jurisdictional regulations, 172 or regulations
aimed at a few individuals. 73 The administrative burden on the
agency and courts would be significant if the validity of the
underlying regulation could be challenged in every enforcement
proceeding. If, however, review is afforded only when the due
process factors weigh heavily in favor of allowing the defend-
ant's challenge, 74 the administrative and fiscal burden would not
be consequential. 
71
coal operator may not participate in rulemakings concerning prime farmland or mining
in alluvial valley floors because no properties on which it operates contains either of
these features. Yet, it is much more foreseeable that the company will be impacted by
prime farmland regulations in the future since these soil types exist in eastern Kentucky
whereas alluvial valleys are located primarily in the western United States. See also
examples cited supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
,61 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
I69 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
70 See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
171 See supra note 80.
'7 See supra note 81.
171 When a controversial rule is aimed at a few individuals and involves adjudicative
type facts concerning the person's activities, business, or property, the government's
interest may be overshadowed by the individual's due process rights. See, e.g., Londoner,
210 U.S. at 385 (tax assessment against a few individuals). Cf. Southern R.R. Co. v.
Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1933) (finding that an administrative officer cannot be
granted authority to eliminate defendant's railroad grade crossing under a statute unless
the defendant had opportunity to challenge the officer's findings in a hearing). However,
if the rule is based on general policy decisions and is to be applied to the public, then
an individual's potential contribution to the fashioning of the rule is less important. See
supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 143.
"' This is especially true since the burden of establishing that the balancing factors
favor review of the challenged regulation is placed on the claimant. See Yakus, 321 U.S.
at 437.
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This balancing approach as applied to an enforcement pro-
ceeding challenge of the validity of a regulation such as 30
C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2), 7 6 should support a claimant's due process
right to be heard despite a statutory time bar when the following
circumstances exist:
(1) the defendant faces a severe penalty such as revocation of
a mining permit or criminal sanctions;
(2) the defendant was not in the mining industry at the time
the regulation was adopted or had no real business justifica-
tions (impact threat) for challenging the regulations at that
time;
(3) the regulation was not challenged previously by another
party on the same grounds;1
7 7
(4) the regulation is not a substantive performance standard;
(5) the grounds of the challenge are well suited for judicial
review such as constitutionality or lack of statutory authority;
and
(6) a cursory review of the regulation indicates that the chal-
lenge has merit.
The presence of all these factors would create the strongest
due process argument for not applying the sixty-day bar of
Section 526(a)(1). Possibly, a court could find due process im-
plicated with less. 78 This conclusion is not inconsistent with the
holding in Yakus.179 The defendants in Yakus were subject to
criminal sanctions but were also directly and adversely impacted
by the price regulations from the day they became effective.8 0
'76 For the text of the regulation see supra note 38. The claim raised by the
defendant would be that OSM does not have authority to issue Notices of Violations in
a state with primacy because the regulation unlawfully extends OSM's enforcement
authority beyond the statutory limits established under the Act. See supra notes 38-40
and accompanying text.
30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) (1982) appears to have made it through the sixty-day
window for review without being challenged on ultra vires grounds.
17 Cf. Holmes Limestone v. Andrus, 655 F.2d 732, 738 (6th Cir. 1981) (allowing
judicial review of the regulation where the small mine operator had no knowledge of
the regulation's promulgation). Note that courts have tended to avoid the constitutional
issues in construing statutory restrictions on review, but the courts eventually will be
faced with a due process claim by a defendant with more compelling circumstances than
existed in Yakus. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 434-37.
m Yakus, 321 U.S. at 434-37.
Id. at 434.
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Also, the petitioner's challenge of the underlying price regulation
was not based on jurisdictional or constitutional grounds.18 The
Court was careful in its Yakus opinion to note that due process
may be violated by the application of a statutory review restric-
tion when the circumstances establish that the prior opportunity
was inadequate. 8 2 The balancing factors outlined in Mathews
can be used to ascertain when the due process threshold has
been crossed. 83 The state of the lower courts on this issue
illustrates that some type of guidance is needed.8 4 As Yakus
establishes, due process will only be violated by a statutory
limitation on rulemaking review under the most compelling cir-
cumstances.' 85
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS
When the party challenging the validity of a rulemaking
under SMCRA is a defendant in an enforcement proceeding, the
principle of separation of powers8 6 may prevent Congress from
restricting a court's jurisdiction to hear claims based on consti-
tutional or jurisdictional grounds. 8 7 In this situation, Congress
has not totally removed all jurisdiction from the court as it can
81 The petitioners in Yakus apparently claimed that the Administrator in fixing the
maximum meat prices did not comply with the requirement that established prices be
"fair and equitable and effectuate the purposes of the Act." Id. at 419-20. The Court
explicitly noted that it was not deciding whether a party could "defend on the ground
that the regulation [was] unconstitutional on its face." Id. at 446-47.
"I Id. at 434. See also Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 665 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that there are limits to how far an agency action can be shielded
from judicial review).
"1 Mathews, 434 U.S. at 335. Factors listed supra note 143.
'" Compare Holmes Limestone, 655 F.2d at 738 (review of the regulation allowed)
with Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469, 472-76 (11th Cir. 1984) (no review
allowed) and Clinchfield Coal Co., 802 F.2d at 103 (review precluded by § 526(a)(1)).
" Yakus, 321 U.S. at 434-37. See also Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 658-60 (requiring
indigents to pay a $25 filing fee for appeal of agency action depriving them of welfare
entitlements does not deny due process).
8 "As an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances,
and as a guarantee of the judicial impartiality, Art. III both defines the power and
protects the independence of the Judicial Branch." Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982).
117 Cf. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 58-87; Immigration and Natu-
ralization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181
(1986). See generally BATOR, supra note 47, at 336-44.
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do under Article 111.18 Instead, the statutory preclusion from
hearing claims as to a regulation's validity impacts on the "way"
the court must decide the case.189 Congressional limitations on
the manner in which a court can act implicate separation of
powers conflicts because Congress is in effect deciding part of
the case itself.'19 When the intrusion is so serious that Congress
in effect removes essential attributes of judicial power from the
courts, then the statutory restriction cannot stand.' 91 In this
situation, the Court, and not Congress, has the final say as to
whether a statutory provision improperly encroaches on the power
reserved to a particular branch.1'9
At least one case holds that Congress violates separation of
powers constraints when it tells a court how it must decide a
case. 193 In United States v. Klein, 94 the Supreme Court found a
congressional attempt to alter rules of evidence previously estab-
lished by the Court to be unconstitutional. 95 By precluding the
Court from giving "the effect to evidence which, in its own
judgment, such evidence should have ... Congress inadvertently
passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power.' ' 96 In Klein, Congress attempted to remove certain issues
from the Court's consideration while leaving them with jurisdic-
tion to otherwise decide the case.' 97
'" In an enforcement hearing under SMCRA, the district court which had jurisdic-
tion to enforce the Secretary's findings is precluded from hearing claims as to the validity
of regulation by § 526(a)(1) if the sixty-day review period has expired. 30 U.S.C. §
1276(a)(1) (1982). See also supra note 3.
"' See BATOR, supra note 47, at 336-37.
"' Id. See also United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980) ("A Judiciary
free from control by the Executive and Legislature is essential if there is a right to have
claims decided by judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of
government.").
I" See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 962; Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 87.
192 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S 186, 211 (1962) (The decision is a "delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation.").
91 United States v. Klein, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
1% Id.
"91 Id. at 147-48. The Act in question provided that a Presidential pardon could
not be admitted into evidence to show a noncombatant Southerner's proof of loyalty to
the union during the Civil War. Id. at 143-44. The Act also attempted to remove
jurisdiction from the Court to hear the case when the claim was based on a pardon as
evidence of loyalty. Id.
"9 Id. at 147.
'9' Id. at 143-44.
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The Court in Yakus, however, permitted Congress to restrict
an enforcement court's jurisdiction to hear challenges to regu-
lations promulgated under the Emergency Price Control Act. 98
The Court's approval of the sixty-day review limitation came
despite the strong separation of powers warnings in Justice Ru-
tledge's dissent.
It is one thing for Congress to withhold jurisdiction. It is
entirely another to confer it and direct that it be exercised in
a manner inconsistent with constitutional requirements or, what
in some instances may be the same thing, without regard to
them. Once it is held that Congress can require the courts
criminally to enforce unconstitutional laws or statutes, includ-
ing regulations, or to do so without regard for their validity,
the way will have been found to circumvent the supreme law
and, what is more, to make the courts parties to doing so.
This Congress cannot do. There are limits to the judicial
power. Congress may impose others. And, in some matters
Congress or the President has final say under the Constitution.
But whenever the judicial power is called into play, it is re-
sponsible directly to the fundamental law and no other au-
thority can intervene to force or authorize the judicial body to
disregard it. 199
Somewhere between Klein and Yakus Congress encroaches
on the judicial power of the courts. 2°° A key distinction between
the cases is that in Yakus Congress did provide some opportunity
for judicial review via the sixty-day period. 20' Also, Klein in-
volved a direct mandate as to how to rule on an issue of law. 20 2
In Yakus, Congress only acted to remove certain claims from
consideration. 23 Third, in Klein Congress infringed on an area
,- 321 U.S. 414, 434-37 (1944). For full discussion of case see supra notes 108-18
and accompanying text.
' Yakus, 321 U.S. at 468 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
In Yakus, the majority upheld the sixty-day statutory restriction on challenging
regulations under the EPCA even though the claim was raised in a criminal enforcement
proceeding. Id. at 446-47.
'o' Yakus, 321 U.S. at 428 (review was in the Emergency Court of Appeals).
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147 (The Act required the Court to give the evidence
"an effect precisely contrary" to that which the Supreme Court had previously given
it.).
" Yakus, 321 U.S. at 431 (The Act barred the courts from hearing challenges of
the regulation's validity during an enforcement prosecution; however, this effectively
affirms the regulation's validity.).
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with constitutional underpinnings because it affected the power
of the Executive to issue pardons.20 The majority in Yakus
explicitly noted that claims concerning the regulation's consti-
tutionality were not at issue.205 Finally, the legislative restrictions
in Klein were motivated by a desire to control the outcome of
particular cases and were not based on any legitimate objec-
tives. 2
06
Examination of recent separation of powers cases indicates
the degree to which the current Court is willing to let Congress
restrict the scope of review of enforcement courts. 207 The dis-
tinctions between Klein and Yakus 20 8 provide the framework for
approaching this problem: (1) what types of claims can Congress
remove from the courts completely; and (2) if some types of
challenges cannot otherwise be totally precluded from judicial
review, whether a limited pre-enforcement review period protects
against a separation of powers violation.
A. Types of Challenges Sought to be Precluded
The "public rights" doctrine recognizes that Congress is free
to commit some matters exclusively to a legislative court or an
administrative agency for determination without impacting on
separation of powers concerns. 209 Public rights include those
"'matters arising' between the [g]overnment and persons subject
to its authority in connection with the performance of the con-
stitutional functions of the executive or legislative depart-
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147-48.
"' Yakus, 321 U.S. at 437-38. See supra note 181.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 wall.) at 145 (The controlling purpose of Congress was to
"deny ...pardons granted by the President the effect which this [C]ourt had adjudged
them to have."). See also Sager, Forward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress'
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. RaV. 17, 77
(1981).
m The branches are not hermetically sealed from one another and some overlap
of powers takes place that is not constitutionally forbidden. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 121 (1976).
See supra notes 201-06. The key distinctions concern: the type of issues removed
from the court, the manner in which they are removed (immediately or after sixty days),
and the congressional motives for the restrictions.
"I Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 67-68; Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279
U.S. 438, 452 (1929); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272, 284 (1855).
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ments. ' 210 This doctrine is limited to those matters that are
traditionally functions of those departments2 1' and does not ex-
tend to "any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a
suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.
212
The public rights doctrine supports the ability of Congress
to preclude judicial review of a regulation's validity under Sec-
tion 526(a)(1) of SMCRA when the grounds for the challenge
relate to a matter of agency discretion in formulating substantive
regulations. 23 The substance of rules regulating surface mining
activities undoubtedly is traditionally controlled by the legislative
branch. When Congress is dealing with an area of statutory
origin, 214 "it clearly has the discretion, in defining [those] right[s]
to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe
remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate
[those] right[s] must do so before particularized tribunals created
to perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to [those]
right[s]." 21 5
When, however, an act of Congress2 16 impacts on a
private right which can otherwise be protected by a suit at
common law,217 separation of powers mandates that some
230 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
", Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 458; Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458
U.S. at 69 n.23 (The presence of the United States as a party "is a necessary but not
sufficient means of distinguishing 'private rights' from 'public rights.' ").
232 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 69 n.23 (quoting Murray's Lessee,
59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284) (emphasis in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co.).
11 Typically, these would include a claim that the regulation was arbitrary or
capricious. See supra note 162. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), involved a
regulatory challenge of this type. See supra note 181. Cf. Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404,
412 (1977) (finding that factual determinations by the Director that a state meeting the
requirements of § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act was barred from judicial review); Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n., 430 U.S. 442, 450
(1977).
234 This area includes creation of substantive rights created in rulemakings pursuant
to Congress' broad constitutional powers. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at
83 n.35.
2 Id. at 83. See also Atlas Roofing Co., 430 U.S. at 458 (Administrative fact-
finding is valid "where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an
otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights.").
236 Also included are regulations adopted by an agency in its legislative capacity.
237 In Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, the Court examined the law of
England and the United States at the time the Constitution was adopted to ascertain if
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW AND POLICY
degree"1 8 of judicial review be available to resolve conflicts." 9
Challenges to a regulation based on constitutional grounds must
be reviewable at some point by the courts.22 ° A concern that re-
mains is whether any other types of challenges to a regulation must
be reviewable by an Article III court." '
A claim that an agency acted in excess of its statutory
authority should also be reviewable by the courts and cannot be
subject to a statutory attempt to preclude the question.
2 2 Just
as court review is available to insure that Congress has not
overstepped its constitutional limits,22 3 judicial review must be
available to determine if an agency has acted beyond its statutory
limits. 2 4 When a statute attempts to preclude ultra vires chal-
the right was recognized as actionable at common law. Id. at 280-82. See also Atlas
Roofing Co., 430 U.S. at 449 (construing suits at common law).
218 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 115 (White, J., dissenting) (suggest-
ing that "the presence of appellate review by an Art. III court will go a long way toward
insuring a proper separation of powers"); Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376, 386 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (certain "private" state law claims must be heard by Article III courts).
219 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 87, 91, 115. The plurality (Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stephens), concurrence (Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor), and the dissent (Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Powell) all
seem to agree that where constitutional claims are at stake, Article III precludes Congress
from removing the question entirely from the courts. The concurrence disagreed with
the plurality's view of the public/private right distinction because the plurality placed
more emphasis on Congressionally created rights than did Crowell. The dissenters
acknowledged that the bankruptcy courts were granted power to hear some traditionally
private claims but believed the appellate review available in the Article III courts was
sufficient to prevent separation of powers violation.
21 Id. See generally Sager, supra note 206, at 76-77. Recall that the issue Congress
precluded in Klein had constitutional underpinnings because Congress was prescribing
law as to the effect of a Presidential pardon under Article II. United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147-48.
, For example, under the APA a regulation can be challenged on other legal
grounds besides constitutionality. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C), (D)-(F) (1982). See supra
note 54.
m Owens v. Hill, 450 F. Supp. 218 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("The separation of powers
and delegation concepts mandate review even in the face of the preclusion statute to
insure that an agency has not violated its statutory authority."). See also Note, supra
note 148, at 786-87. Note that the "otherwise inconsistent with law" standard may also
be a ground that cannot be totally removed from judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(1982).
23 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
22 "[E]xecutive action is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation
that authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review. .... "
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983). See
also supra note 42.
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lenges to agency action, constitutional underpinnings are in-
volved. The reason an agency can legislate in the first instance
is because its grant of authority was within the constitutional
limits of the nondelegation doctrine. 225 If the nondelegation doc-
trine is to have any significance, court review must be available
at some stage to insure an agency is acting within its statutory
framework. 226 An agency cannot have the final say in defining
the limits of its delegated powers. Allowing Congress to oust the
courts of jurisdiction to hear claims that an agency acted beyond
its jurisdictional limits "would be to sap the judicial power as
it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a gov-
ernment of a bureaucratic character alien to our system . . 227
B. Effect of Limited Court Review
Congress cannot totally preclude courts from hearing chal-
lenges of regulations based on constitutional or jurisdictional
grounds.228 The question still remains as to the extent to which
Congress can limit court review of these issues. When Congress
attempts to limit the jurisdiction of an enforcement court to
hear constitutionally based claims, 229 it is impacting on an area
traditionally left to the courts. 230 The boundaries between the
branches, however, are not clearly defined and some interplay
and overlap necessarily occurs without creating separation of
powers problems.23 1 The separation of powers issue is whether
"I See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-
42 (1935) (finding the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional because the
legislative delegation was too broad and without standards for guidance).
22 See supra notes 42 and 222.
, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932) (construing the statute so as to not
remove jurisdictional fact questions from Article III courts).
" See supra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
29 In this context, a "constitutionally based claim" includes claims that an agency
acted in excess of its statutory authority in promulgating a rule. See supra notes 224-
25 and accompanying text.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
23 "In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the
sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought
to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended to operate
with absolute independence." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974). See also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (The Constitution "enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdepend-
ence, autonomy but reciprocity.").
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Congress has crossed the boundary to the point that it has
impermissibly "impaired or sought to assume a power central
to another branch. .. 232 by so restricting the courts' jurisdic-
tion. 233
The character of congressional action in limiting the scope
of a court's review is indicative of whether Congress has imper-
missibly assumed a judicial branch power. 234 For an unconsti-
tutional assumption of power to exist, the time limiting statute
must be essentially judicial in purpose and effect. 235 The nature
of a branch's action is "confirmed by the character of the...
action it surplants. ' ' 236 A statutory review limitation not only
removes an issue from the courts23 7 which they would otherwise
have jurisdiction to hear, 238 but it also effectively affirms the
validity of the regulation sought to be challenged. 239 In this
regard, Congress is substituting its opinion for that of the
courts.240
232 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring).
2133 Id. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976) ("The Federalist Papers
... are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National
Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches.").
134 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951-52 (one house legislative veto found to be of a
legislative nature); id. at 965 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring) ("In determining whether one
branch unconstitutionally has assumed a power central to another branch, the traditional
characterization of the assumed power as legislative, executive, or judicial may provide
some guidance.").
233 Id. at 952, 965. A case or controversy must be at issue before any action can
be classified as judicial in nature. Id. at 957 n.22. Clearly, a case or controversy in the
Article III sense exists when an impacted party seeks to challenge the validity of a
regulation, especially if the challenge is raised by the defendant in an enforcement
proceeding.
236 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
233 The issue is removed only after the statutory review period has expired (e.g.,
sixty days under SMCRA § 526(a)(1)). 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982).
318 The courts will generally have jurisdiction to hear challenges of agency rulemak-
ings via the organic statute or the federal question jurisdiction grant in 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1982). See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1982) (note that the APA does not grant jurisdiction).
239 Since the court is precluded by statute from hearing the challenge, the validity
of the regulation will stand.
m Of course, if the controversy involves "public" instead of "private" (e.g.,
constitutional) rights, Congress can substitute its opinion for that of the court by
removing the question entirely. See supra notes 209-15 and accompanying text. In the
public right instance, Congress generally has legitimate and often compelling objectives
in so restricting judicial review. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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Even partial participation 24' of Congress in an inherently
judicial area can violate separation of powers. 242 Congressional
restriction of constitutionally based challenges to regulations is
analogous to the separation of power issue present in Bowsher
v. Synar.243 There, the Court held that Congress cannot play a
role in the removal of a purely executive officer. 24 Such a
reservation of power "would, in practical terms, reserve in Con-
gress control over the execution of the laws." 245 Similarly, where
Congress attempts to restrict a court's jurisdiction of constitu-
tionally based claims, it impermissibly prevents a court from
performing its ultimate function 2 " and assumes a role in the
decision of constitutional issues in violation of Article 111.247
If Section 526(a)(1) of SMCRA is construed to bar consti-
tutional and ultra vires challenges to OSM regulations, a court
could readily hold the section unconstitutional on either imper-
24 Because the regulation is effectively "affirmed" for all time after the review
period has expired, imposing a sixty-day limitation on all types of challenges is like
partial participation by Congress in the judicial review process, especially since the court
otherwise had jurisdiction to enforce the Secretary's action. See BATOR, supra note 47,
at 336-37.
' Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926) (For the legislative branch "to
draw to itself . . . the right to participate in the exercise of [another branches power]
... would be ... to infringe the constitutional principle of the separation of govern-
mental powers."). See also Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3188-89 (1986) (holding
that Congress cannot hold removal power over purely executive officers).
106 S. Ct. at 3188-89.
Id. However, the Court did point out that Congress has authority to remove
executive officers through impeachment. Id. at 3188.
"I Id. at 3188. Similar assumptions of power were also condemned by the Court
in Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), where the majority opinion stated:
Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the
'judicial [p]ower ... can no more be shared with the Executive Branch
than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the
veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override
a Presidential veto.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 704.
"[T]o say what the law is." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
, See supra notes 242-45 and accompanying text. This conclusion suggests that
the Yakus majority would have agreed with Justice Rutledge's analysis had the regulation
been challenged on constitutional grounds-an issue which the majority explicitly avoided.
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 446-47 (1944). Accord United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-48 (1872) (the restriction impacted on the effect the Court
could give to a presidential pardon).
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missive interference24 or assumed function grounds. 249 Although
Congress can validly restrict or totally preclude claims when
private rights are not at stake, 250 an Article III court should be
available to hear claims that the agency acted in excess of its
statutory authority or in derogation of other constitutional
rights.2'
The availability of judicial review on these issues for sixty
days following promulgation of the rule is not sufficient to
reserve the "essential attributes of the judicial power . . . in an
Article III court.' '232 The Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Mar-
athon Pipeline Co. plurality 253 and concurrence25 4 establish that
more than limited review of private right claims must be avail-
able to avoid invalidation of the statute. Although the dissent
in Northern Pipeline believes that "the presence of appellate
review by an Article III court will go a long way toward insuring
a proper separation of powers, ' 211 they recognized that the
legislative scheme should "accommodate" rather than "substan-
tially undermine" Article III values. 216 Accordingly, these various
I" Where the intention of Congress is to preclude constitutional challenges of
regulations from review as well as other types of claims, a court should examine the
objectives Congress intends to achieve. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145; see also
Sager, supra note 206, at 77.
9 See supra notes 234-46 and accompanying text.
z See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
252 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 87.
"I The suggestion that Article III is satisfied so long as some degree of appellate
review is available "is directly contrary to the text of our Constitution.... Our prece-
dents make it clear that the constitutional requirements for the exercise of the judicial
power must be met at all stages of adjudication, and not only on appeal, where the
court is restricted to considerations of law .. " Id. at 85 n.39 (plurality opinion).
1-" The concurrence found the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutional because it
only provided for traditional appellate review in Article III courts of "traditional actions
at common law." Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 90-91. The limited role
of the courts is insufficient to prevent violation of Article III where common law rights
are in dispute. Id. at 91. The concurrence did not join the plurality in its elaboration of
the public/private right distinction. Id. (Rehnquist, J., and O'Connor, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 115 (Burger, C.J., White, J., and Powell, J., dissenting).
z16 Id. The dissent also noted that "the burden on Art. III values should ... be
measured against the values Congress hopes to serve .. " Id. at 115. This approach is
similar to the motive analysis in Klein. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145. See supra note
248. Once again, this author questions what legitimate motives of Congress can be served
by restricting constitutional review of legislative rules.
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views of the Court lead to the conclusion that enforcement courts
must always have jurisdiction to hear constitutionally based chal-
lenges to legislative rules that are the underlying basis of an
administrative order.
CONCLUSION
The sixty-day limitation on judicial review in Section 526(a)(1)
of SMCRA fits the mold of similar statutory restrictions in
environmental statutes. The sixty-day cutoff on rulemaking re-
view is beneficial to the efficient and effective administration of
the surface coal mining regulatory program. The preclusive reach
of Section 526(a)(1) has not been definitely established. The
sixty-day review limitation clearly cuts off untimely substantive
attacks on regulations but also could be interpreted to extend to
challenges based on constitutional or ultra vires grounds. When
such provisions limiting judicial review are interpreted to encom-
pass all challenges regardless of the basis of the claim or circum-
stances, due process and separation of powers concerns are
raised.
The sixty-day review period goes a long way in protecting a
party's due process rights. In some extenuating circumstances
due process may mandate that a court review the claimant's
regulatory challenge despite the expiration of the sixty-day review
period. The government's interest in restricting judicial review
is greatest when a petitioner seeks untimely review of the sub-
stance of a performance standard; and thus, this type of chal-
lenge can readily be barred without violating due process. When,
however, a defendant in an enforcement proceeding seeks to
attack a regulation on other legal grounds, a balancing of inter-
ests may support the claimant's due process right to be heard.
The defendant's prior opportunity to challenge the regulation,
whether similar claims were previously brought, the degree of
threatened injury to the defendant, and the government's interest
should all be balanced to determine if due process rights have
been violated.
Separation of powers problems are raised when a statutory
bar on judicial review is interpreted as extending to challenges
of regulations based on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds.
Such a congressional restriction impermissibly interferes with an
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inherent judicial function. Therefore, Section 526(a)(1) is uncon-
stitutional to the extent that it is construed as barring constitu-
tional or ultra vires challenges of a regulation after the review
period has expired. Barring these "private right" claims from
judicial review after only sixty days removes essential attributes
from the Article III courts that are necessary to maintain the
proper balance of powers as mandated by the Constitution.
Jack C. Bender
